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WASHINGTON
Price v. Seattle, 24 P.3d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding city of
Seattle not liable for failing to prevent landslide that destroyed several
homes, because landslide was caused by natural conditions).
Landslides damaged the Burg and Heil-Hartnegel's ("Burg")
homes on Magnolia Bluff in Seattle, from an upper slope owned by the
city of Seattle ("City"), in February 1996. The bluff was made of dense
glacial till, which has been naturally eroding for thousands of years.
Studies performed by a consulting firm concluded unprecedented
rainfall built up the water pressure in the till cliff to a critical level,
triggering the slides. The report recommended that the City upgrade
the falling bluff and install groundwater pumps. The City installed
some pumps in November 1996, but more were needed to prevent
danger. The City posted orders on several houses on Perkins Lane
warning of imminent danger and requiring the residents to vacate.
After a season of heavy rain and snow, all of the residents' homes were
eventually destroyed in 1997 and rendered uninhabitable. The Burgs
brought suit against the City, alleging negligence, inverse
condemnation and trespass. The trial court held the action failed for
lack of a duty owed to the Burgs.
The Burg's negligence theory was based on the idea that the City
owed a duty to take reasonable measures to stabilize the slope and that
an alteration on the City's property caused the bluff to become
unnaturally vulnerable to the natural forces at work. This court held
that the City, as possessor of land, owed no duty to the Burgs to take
measures to stabilize the slope above Perkins Lane. They also held
that this conclusion was consistent with the surface water doctrine,
invoked by the Burgs as an alternate theory of liability, where a
landowner is liable for damage caused by errant surface water flows
only where the landowner has engaged in activities that alter the flow.
The court's holding stems from a previous case, Albin v. National
Bank of Commerce where a tree killed a motorist during a windstorm and
the bank was not held liable because the injury stemmed from a
natural condition. This court reasoned that under Albin, to establish a
duty owed by a landowner to prevent harm to others outside the land,
it was not enough to establish that the landowner had actual or
constructive notice of a dangerous natural condition, but must also
have notice of an alteration to the land that makes it more dangerous
than if it had remained in its natural condition. The bank in Albin was
not aware of the heightened risk of the logging operations on its land.
In the present case, the Burgs needed to show that an alteration on the
City's property caused the bluff to become unnaturally vulnerable to
the natural forces. The City's landscaping was not a sufficient
alteration, because the land remained in a natural state.
The inverse condemnation claim was based on the theory that the
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City took the Burg's property by artificially channeling water from its
own property onto the bluff and thereby undermining its stability.
This court held that this claim failed for the same reasons the
negligence claim failed, lack of evidence that the City artificially
channeled water onto the bluff.
Finally, the Burgs argued the City had trespassed on their property
because the City knew that a landslide was a substantially certain
consequence of its failure to take preventive measures. The court did
not accept the Burg's argument because they failed to show authority,
which stated that an "act," as used in defining the elements of trespass,
means a failure to act, and the Burg's negligence and trespass claims
were therefore the same.
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WISCONSIN
Maple Leaf Farms, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Res., 633
N.W.2d 720 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the Department of
Natural Resources has the authority to regulate off-site manure
spreading).
Maple Leaf Farms, Inc, ("Maple Leaf") appealed an order
upholding the Department of Natural Resources' ("DNR") authority
to regulate Maple Leafs spreading of manure. Maple Leaf is the
largest producer and processor of ducks in the state of Wisconsin. The
Maple Leaf duck facilities created a significant amount of manure
through production. Maple Leaf routinely applied a portion of this
manure to the fields located on company property and sold the
Maple Leaf
remaining manure to area farmers for fertilizer.
transported and applied the manure to the farmers' fields. According
to expert testimony at the administrative hearing, the spreading of
manure on fields resulted in the release of pollutants into both surface
and groundwater. The DNR issued wastewater permits to Maple Leaf
requiring them to maintain runoff control structures and to
implement procedures for the storage and disposal of animal wastes.
Under the Wisconsin Pollution Discharge Elimination System
permit program, the DNR asserted that they had the authority to
regulate spreading of manure that took place on property that was not
owned by Maple Leaf ("off-site"). DNR also asserted that they could
condition the issuance of permits on compliance with groundwater
protection standards. Maple Leaf claimed that the DNR had no
authority to regulate manure spreading off-site because the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") does not regulate off-site manure spreading. The
CWA prohibits the "discharge" of any pollutant by any person into
navigable waters from any point source, but it does not regulate
manure spreading once the manure leaves the property where it was

